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Abstract
Background: Health systems in Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) are in urgent need of improvement. The private health sector is a
major provider of care in the region and it will remain a significant actor in the future. Any efforts by SSA governments to
improve health systems performance therefore has to account for the private health sector. Regional and international
actors increasingly recognize importance of effectively engaging with the private health sector, and initiatives to improve
engagement are underway in several countries. However, there is little systematic analysis of private health providers’ view
and experience with engagement.
Methodology/Principal Findings: In this study we surveyed private health facilities in Kenya and Ghana to understand the
extent to which and how governments interact and engage with these facilities. The results suggest that government
engagement with private health facilities is quite limited. The primary focus of this engagement is ‘‘command-and-control’’
type regulations to improve the quality of care. There is little attention paid to building the capacity of health care
businesses through either technical or financial assistance. The vast majority of these facilities also receive no government
assistance in meeting public health and social goals. Finally, government engagement with private pharmacies is often
neglected and clinics receive a disproportionate share of government assistance.
Conclusions/Significance: Overall, our findings suggest that there may be considerable untapped potential for greater
engagement with private health facilities—particularly pharmacies. Improving engagement will likely help governments
with limited resources to better take advantage of the private sector capacity to meet access and equity objectives and to
accelerate the achievement of the Millennium Development Goals.
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Introduction
Across the developing world, the private sector has a well-
documented presence in healthcare. In sub-Saharan Africa private
providers account for as much as 50 percent of health care
provision [1]. Yet the appropriate role for the private health sector
remains a controversial issue. While users may prefer the private
sector due to perceived quality, easier access and greater
responsiveness, in some cases technical standards of care might
be poor [2–6] and private sector provision may limit access for the
poor [7], [8]. Others argue that budget-constrained national
health systems may be best served by making the most of the
private health sector [9,10] [11]. Recent evidence from 34 sub
Saharan countries also suggests that increased private sector
participation may be associated with greater access to services as
well as greater equity [12].
Although the debate about the role of the private sector in
health care is far from resolved, governments, international
organizations and donors have begun to work more with the
private health sector since the 1980s [7]. For developing country
policymakers, given the size and contributions of the private health
sector, a policy of engagement might no longer be just an option
but a necessary step towards achieving large-scale improvements
in public health. The central question is therefore not whether to
interact with the private health sector, but how to best do so in a
manner that produces desirable outcomes. Lagomarsino et al.
(2009) [13] argue that it is important for policymakers to remain
focused on effective public stewardship—i.e. setting and enforcing
the rules and incentives that define the environment and guide the
behaviors of health-system players, an issue on which there is
relatively strong consensus and hence opportunity for progress.
However, rigorous evaluations of different approaches to engage
with the private sector remain sparse, and are confined largely to
case studies [7,14] [15].
In spite of the perception that many governments fail to
constructively engage the private sector due to political, admin-
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many facets of government-provider interaction remains limited
[13]. Much of the literature focuses primarily on the experience of
government agencies and consumers, and none has clearly
documented government engagement from the perspective of
providers.
In this paper, we provide new evidence about government
engagement with private sector clinics and pharmacies in two
countries, Ghana and Kenya, through the lens of survey data
collected from these providers. Our sample of pharmacies and
clinics captures the most prevalent providers of health services,
though not the full variety of providers. For example, across the
region at least one third of health services are provided by informal
providers [13], which are largely absent in our sample. To
structure the discussion, we first provide a general framework for
conceptualizing government engagement. Next, we describe the
context for our study and the providers included in the study. We
then present the main findings of the paper and draw a number of
conclusions about the specific setting of our study as well as more
general implications and recommendations for research going
forward.
Public-Private Engagement: Influencing Firms
Prior studies have identified a number of key strategic tools that
governments frequently employ under the scope of public-private
engagement [16,17]. These can be thought of as falling into three
categories: demand-side interactions that aim to influence
consumer behavior (such as social marketing), supply-side
interactions influencing firm behavior (such as direct purchase or
training), and restructuring or reorganizing market interactions
(such as the creating new public-private entities).
This paper characterizes supply-side interactions that are
intended to influence firm behavior in two primary domains: (1)
increasing overall access and equity in access to health care, and
(2) increasing the quality of health care services. We distinguish
between the following approaches, which in practice may vary
across domains as well as provider types. As an aside, We
acknowledge that interventions and supply-side interactions in
particular can be categorized differently. The breakdown offered
here provides a chance to highlight the aspects our research
focused on, while being largely compatible with other standard
frameworks [18].
Monitoring: Gathering information on the activities of the
private sector. At the most fundamental level, governments
seeking to engage with the private sector need to know the size and
composition of the private health sector. They also need to have
the ability to monitor its activity on an ongoing basis. Examples of
this include administrative reporting on the number of providers
and types/volume of patients they treat and routinely collecting
and assessing information on adverse events or patient complaints.
This is a crucial aspect of engagement for three reasons. First, such
information is crucial for planning and implementing public health
programs, especially in countries where private providers are an
important access point for health care delivery. For example, it is
difficult to establish effective disease surveillance programs without
knowing the disease burden for patients being treated in private
health facilities. Second, information on private sector size and
composition is key for understanding how public policy and other
macroeconomic factors are shaping the behavior of the private
sector. Finally, without such information it is nearly impossible to
evaluate the intended and unintended consequences of other forms
of engagement with the private health sector.
Information Provision/Technical Assistance: Supplying
information to support the activities of the private
sector. Firms may fail to maximize their potential scope of
business or to comply with appropriate quality standards if they
lack the requisite information or training. Simply providing
information to the private sector can be a straightforward but
important aspect of capacity building and can improve both access
to care and quality of care. For example, lack of knowledge about
formal credit markets and financial management can be a
significant barrier to operating or expanding a health care
facility. Government technical assistance programs can reduce
such barriers by providing the necessary skills. Ultimately,
improved facility performance and growth—induced by
government technical assistance—will increase access to care.
Similarly, governments can provide technical assistance to
promote quality of care by disseminating information on
standards of care or best practice guidelines and by providing
continuing education workshops or classes that are open to both
the public and private sector.
These investments in improving the skills of private health
providers are relatively uncontroversial in that the role of the
government may be interpreted as simply increasing the flow or
supply of information.
Financial Assistance: Subsidies, contracting and direct
purchase. A more interventionist approach is providing direct
financial assistance to the private health sector in the form of
grants, subsidies or government contracts to purchase health care
services. Examples of financial assistance include land grants for
improving access or subsidies for purchasing or upgrading medical
equipment to improve quality. Waters et al. (2003) [17] and
Loevinsohn and Harding (2003) [19] note a number of examples
of contracting-out for primary care and other child health services,
from Senegal, Madagascar, El Salvador, Cambodia, Guatemala,
South Africa and Zimbabwe. While a majority of these
experiences involve NGOs, a growing number also involve for-
profit contractors. Sometimes financial assistance can be
‘‘performance based’’ in that it is tied to achievement of specific
outcomes or provision of specific services. For example, private
providers who report providing care to a target number of rural
patients may receive a supplementary allowance or priority in
receiving loans. Governments may also provide incentives to
private facilities for the provision of public health goods such as
health education, vaccination and other interventions to prevent
infectious diseases.
Regulation. Government can choose to implement
‘‘command-and-control’’ style rules and penalties and thereby
exercise its authority to require and enforce what it considers to be
desirable practice. Regulation can apply to measures to protect the
quality of care, for instance by establishing minimum cleanliness
standards and penalties for violations. It can also be used to
expand access and increase equity, for example by imposing price
controls or requirements that private providers exempt certain
types of patients from fees. Regulatory approaches are limited,
however, in that they often treat all regulated entities the same and
may not be economically efficient.
While potentially more powerful than monitoring and informa-
tion provision, financial assistance and regulation can have
unintended consequences. For example, price controls to improve
access might deter provider entry into health care markets and
thus reduce access in the long run. Prior studies of price controls in
China document numerous other unintended consequences
including the emergence of a black market, overprovision of
profitable high-tech services, and overuse of prescription drugs
[20]. Similarly, subsidies and financial assistance to providers
might promote inefficiency by using public funds to bolster
inefficient providers. As with most public programs, such
Government Engagement and Private Health Providers
PLoS ONE | www.plosone.org 2 November 2011 | Volume 6 | Issue 11 | e27194interventions may be prone to error, fraud and corruption, as well
as susceptible to capture by special interest groups. Using
performance based incentives can mitigate some of these concerns
but may not offset others: for instance, targets may be
inappropriately set, or measurement and compliance may be
manipulated for gain.
Given the tradeoffs across different types of engagement
policies, the debate over the extent and nature of government
intervention is domain and context specific. For instance,
sensitivity to the issues above: may be greater when policies are
aimed at providing financial incentives to private facilities to
promote access rather than policies aimed at upholding quality
standards; may depend on the type of provider; or may be linked
to overall governance in the country. It is important to note that
the approaches described above may be initiated or directed by
entities that are not part of the government. Private health sector
associations and third parties (e.g., accreditation agencies,
insurance agencies) may engage in some or all of the approaches.
In this paper, however, we leave the role of associations aside. The
goal of this paper is to characterize the approaches taken by the
governments of Ghana and Kenya, as reportedly experienced by
private sector providers.
Methods
Study sample and location
The nature of health systems and the environment in which
patients seek care and firms do business varies tremendously from
country to country, across the developing world. Within any given
country the private health sector encompasses a diverse set of
providers, divided by many distinctions, including position on the
supply-chain, for-profit status, religious/secular affiliation, degree
of formality, and participation in allopathic or traditional medical
practice [17,21]. Any discussion of engagement can be specific to a
particular subset of this group.
Sample description
The data used for the study come from the Health Provider
Assessment Survey, which was administered in Ghana and Kenya
during 2010 by the study team. HPAS samples for each country
were designed to capture a broad range of health facility types,
focusing primarily on smaller, private sector firms. In Ghana, the
sampling frame was based on a 2010 census of health facilities in
seven districts purposively chosen to be geographically and
economically diverse, carried out by the Results for Development
Institute. We excluded laboratories and medical device manufac-
turers and out of the remaining 647 facilities, we interviewed a
random sample of 300 hospitals, clinics, nursing homes and
pharmacies. Private hospitals and clinics were oversampled. In
Kenya, we constructed a census of health facilities in five districts
also reflective of geographic and economic diversity, by combining
a list of 1920 hospitals, clinics, and nursing homes compiled by the
Ministry of Health and KEMRI-Wellcome Trust with a list of
1948 pharmacies from a retail census collected by TNS Opinion.
Table 1. HPAS sample composition by country.
Kenya Ghana
Public Private Public Private
Hospital 1 10 8 21
Clinic 11 112 31 68
Pharmacy 1 145 0 92
Chemical Sellers 0 6 0 80
Nursing/maternity homes 0 7 0 0
Other 5 2 0 0
18 282 39 261
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0027194.t001
Figure 1. Periodic Reporting Type. Countries: N Dark Grey: Kenya N Light Grey: Ghana.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0027194.g001
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clinics, nursing homes and pharmacies drawn from this census,
oversampling private hospitals and clinics.
Table 1 shows the final HPAS survey composition by provider
type in each country. We note that response rates for the survey
differed across countries - 90 percent in Ghana and 69 percent in
Kenya - but we do not have any evidence of differential self-
selection affecting the final sample composition.
In this paper, we focus on private clinics and pharmacies. We
note that because chemical sellers are not a separate class of
providers for regulatory purposes in Kenya (but not in Ghana), we
include the small number of Kenyan providers that identify as
such under the category of pharmacies. In Ghana, the analytical
sample therefore consisted of 68 clinics and 92 pharmacies. In
Kenya, the sample consisted of 112 clinics and 151 pharmacies.
HPAS Survey Questions
HPAS survey questions are grouped into five core sections: basic
facility characteristics, barriers and obstacles to operating a
business, the policy environment, financial information, and
business process management. In Ghana we included a supple-
mental section regarding the national health insurance scheme,
and in Kenya the survey contained a supplemental section specific
to pharmacies. A final section asks enumerators to provide a basic
assessment of the facility, including information on amenities and
cleanliness.
With respect to interaction with the government, the HPAS
instrument asks questions to providers about various aspects of
regulation and about their experience with government assistance
to build their human and financial capital. The survey also asks
providers whether they have been exposed to financial incentive
schemes and about the nature of partnerships with the government
on certain public health activities.
Monitoring. The HPAS asks providers whether they report
information about their activities to the government across a
variety of domains related to health management systems
reporting, epidemiological surveillance-oriented reporting, and
business operations. In particular, the survey asks providers
whether they send periodic reports to the government on each
of the following: (1) service and drug utilization statistics on the
number or types of patients seen and the number or types of drugs
sold, (2) adverse events such as maternal or child deaths, (3) quality
reporting on compliance with standards, and (4) financial
reporting on operating information such as prices and revenues.
Technical and Financial Assistance for Capacity
Building. Providers in both countries are also asked a series of
questions about supportive resources received from the
government, whether in the form of information, technical
assistance or financial assistance. In particular, the survey asks
providers about assistance (technical or financial) to support them
in two types of activities, during the past three years:
Skill and Technology Upgrades. Providers are asked about
offers of assistance (technical or financial) to support them in five
domains: (1) continuing education for existing providers, (2)
training for future health providers, (3) information about clinical
practice guidelines, (4) quality assurance practices, and (5)
technology upgrades. A follow-up question for those offered
assistance verified whether or not such assistance was actually
received.
Raising Capital. Providers are asked about whether they
receive any technical assistance from the government to support
them in improving their ability to apply for a bank loan, or
whether they received direct financial assistance such as a loan,
grant, subsidized interest, or bank guarantee.
Regulation. In the case of regulation and its enforcement, the
HPAS asks questions that cover two areas: access/equity and
quality.
Access/equity. Providers are asked if their facility is subject
to laws and regulations that mandate (1) the need to provide free
or subsidized care to poor patients, (2) inability to deny treatment
based on cost/ability to pay, and (3) price caps or maximum price
regulations that mandate that prices cannot exceed a certain
threshold.
Quality. Providers are asked about whether they have had an
inspection fromthegovernmentinthe past two yearsformonitoring
the safety and quality of their services. With respect to enforcement,
since facilities may be reluctant and unlikely to answer truthfully
questions about failing inspections, they are also asked an indirect
question about whether they know of any examples of facilities like
theirs that have been penalized by the government for failing to
meet quality standards (with examples given such as selling
counterfeit drugs or causing adverse health events).
Technical and Financial Assistance for Improving Public
Health and Reducing Disparities. As an alternative to
mandates providers are also asked about government-provided
incentives to achieve public health and broader social objectives.
Access to Public Health Services. Providers are asked
about whether in the past 3 years they have received any technical
or financial assistance from the government to provide services
related to public health, specifically: (1) childhood vaccinations, (2)
HIV/AIDS control measures, (3) malaria or tuberculosis (TB)
control measures, and (4) health education for consumers/patients.
Table 2. Facilities providing periodic reports to the government, by type.
Kenya Ghana
Clinics Pharmacies Clinics Pharmacies
N % N % N % N %
Service utilization (number and type of patients) 112 35.7% 151 8.6% 67 40.3% 90 3.3%
Epidemiological reporting: adverse events 112 59.8% 151 39.1% 66 24.2% 89 10.1%
Quality standards reporting 112 54.5% 151 41.7% 67 43.3% 89 31.5%
Financial reporting 112 13.4% 150 13.3% 66 10.6% 86 12.8%
Drug utilization (number and type of drugs) 112 19.6% 151 29.8% 66 7.6% 87 8.0%
Any reporting 112 75.9% 151 70.2% 67 59.7% 91 42.9%
Note: ‘‘Don’t know’’ and refusals are both treated as missing.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0027194.t002
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doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0027194.g002
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facilities that receive help from the government for (1) opening a
facility in a rural area, (2) opening a facility in a poor urban area,
and (3) providing treatment to poor patients.
Results
Monitoring
Figure 1 below shows responses to the questions about
monitoring in both countries, with the Kenyan sample showing
slightly higher rates of overall contact. In Kenya, almost 30% and in
Ghana half of the facilities in the sample stated that they
participated in none of the reporting activities described in the
previous section—although results are not consistent across all
categories. Interestingly, in both countries, facilities are most likely
to report information to the government about quality standards
and somewhat less likely to report on utilization, both in terms of
patient and drug turnover. Finally, an even smaller number of
facilities report any financial information to the government 213%
inKenyaand 12%inGhana.Thesefindingssuggestthatthelimited
monitoring that does exist focuses on the medical aspects of these
facilities but largely neglects their operation as businesses.
Table 3. Facilities offered/receiving technical assistance for skill and technology upgrades from the government in last 3 years, by
type.
Kenya Ghana
Clinics Pharmacies Clinics Pharmacies
N% N% N % N %
Facilities being offered technical support for
Continuing Education 112 25.0% 151 7.3% 68 13.2% 90 6.7%
Information on practice guidelines 112 40.2% 151 8.6% 68 20.6% 90 7.8%
Quality assurance 112 32.1% 151 10.6% 68 22.1% 90 8.9%
Technology upgrades 112 23.2% 151 4.6% 68 8.8% 90 1.1%
Training for future health providers 112 16.1% 151 6.6% 68 8.8% 90 5.6%
Facilities receiving technical support (as % offered)
Continuing Education 28 85.7% 11 90.9% 9 77.8% 6 83.3%
Information on practice guidelines 45 91.1% 13 84.6% 14 85.7% 7 100.0%
Quality assurance 36 83.3% 16 87.5% 15 80.0% 8 100.0%
Technology upgrades 26 88.5% 7 85.7% 6 50.0% 1 100.0%
Training for future health providers 18 94.4% 10 90.0% 6 66.7% 5 100.0%
Note: ‘‘Don’t know’’ and refusals are both coded as missing values.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0027194.t003
Figure 3. Facilities Receiving Financial Assistance. Countries: N Dark Grey: Kenya N Light Grey: Ghana.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0027194.g003
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each country. In both countries clinics are more likely than
pharmacies to report their activities to the government. One
exception is reports related to drug inventory activity in
Kenya, where pharmacies report higher levels of reporting. In
Ghana, pharmacies are only marginally more likely to report
drug inventory relative to clinics. Few facilities—of either type
and in either country—report financial information to the
government.
In summary, the level of government monitoring of private
health facilities across a variety of domains is poor. Clinics are
more likely to be monitored than pharmacies. Domains related to
quality of care are more likely to be monitored than others, but
even for these domains the majority of facilities are not monitored.
Technical Assistance for Capacity Building
Skill and Technology Upgrades. We first examine
government interaction with private facilities regarding technical
assistance related to improving provider skills and technology. The
results can be found in Figure 2 below.
From the top panel of Figure 2, we can see that surprisingly few
facilities receive offers of support related to upgrading human
capital whether in the form of continuing education or training of
future providers (between 7–15% in either case for both countries).
Similarly, less than 15% of facilities in either country report
receiving offers of technology upgrades. Relatively more facilities
are offered assistance related to maintaining quality and practice
standards, although in each case this still reflects less than a
quarter of all facilities.
The bottom panel of Figure 2 shows that the majority of
facilities participate and take advantage of these services if offered.
For facilities not taking up these services, it is not possible from the
data to understand whether it is the result of refusing offered
assistance, or whether it is due to the government’s failure to follow
up.
Table 3 shows an important divergence in these results by
facility type. In both Ghana and Kenya, the offers of technical
support across all dimensions are significantly skewed towards
clinics; yet the take up of technical assistance among clinics and
pharmacies is more comparable.
Table 4. Facilities receiving financial assistance for operating activities from the government in last 3 years, by type.
Kenya Ghana
Clinics Pharmacies Clinics Pharmacies
N% N% N % N %
Facilities receiving financial assistance for
Continuing Education 111 6.3% 151 0.7% 67 1.5% 92 0.0%
Information on practice guidelines 111 6.3% 151 2.0% 67 3.0% 92 0.0%
Quality assurance 111 6.3% 151 2.0% 67 3.0% 92 0.0%
Technology upgrades 111 1.8% 151 0.7% 67 1.5% 92 0.0%
Training for future health providers 111 3.6% 151 1.3% 67 1.5% 92 0.0%
Note: ‘‘Don’t know’’ and refusals are both coded as missing values.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0027194.t004
Figure 4. Facilities Reporting Regulations. Countries: N Dark Grey: Kenya N Light Grey: Ghana.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0027194.g004
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technical assistance to improve their ability to apply for bank
loans. Specifically, 3.8% of facilities in Kenya and no facilities in
Ghana report receiving such technical assistance (not reported in
tables).
In summary, the provision of technical assistance by the
government to private health facilities is fairly uncommon with
more than three quarters of these facilities reporting not receiving
technical assistance. The provision of technical assistance for
improving access to private credit markets is virtually non-existent.
Clinics are more likely to receive technical assistance compared to
pharmacies.
Financial Assistance for Capacity Building
Figure 3 shows that in both countries only a small minority of
facilities (5% or fewer) report receiving direct financial support
from the government for improving provider skills and technology
upgrades. However, across all domains, financial support is more
widely reported in Kenya than Ghana.
Again, in Table 4, we observe that, as with technical assistance,
what little financial assistance exists is skewed towards clinics
rather than pharmacies. Virtually no pharmacies in Kenya and no
pharmacies at all in Ghana report receiving financial assistance for
continuing education, training or technology upgrades.
Regulation
Access/Equity. In both Ghana and Kenya, regulation with
respect to equity-enhancing mandates is reported only by a
minority of facilities (Figure 4). The results clearly point to the
existence of an overall regulatory structure. However, in Kenya
only a quarter to a third of all facilities report being subject to such
mandates. In Ghana the percentages are even lower. Overall,
though the levels differ, price controls are most commonly
reported, while mandates related to the provision of care based
on poverty and the inability to refuse care are much less frequently
reported in both countries (Figure 4). Table 5 shows that in Kenya,
a comparable if not equal amount of regulation appears to apply
to clinics and pharmacies. This is in sharp contrast to Ghana,
where 19% of pharmacies report being to be subject to price
controls but otherwise the sector seems to be relatively untouched
by regulations mandating free or subsidized care.
Quality regulation. Almost 90% of firms in both countries
report having been inspected in the last 2 years. 35% of Kenyan
facilities but only 10% of Ghanaian facilities report having heard of
a case in which a facility like theirs has been penalized for not
meeting qualitystandards(Figure 5).Thebreakdownbyfacilitytype
(Table6)showsthat inboth countries,clinics andpharmacies report
inspection rates of almost 80% or more. In Ghana, pharmacies are
both more likely to be inspected, and more likely to have heard
Table 5. Facilities reporting being subject to access/equity-related regulation, by type.
Kenya Ghana
Clinics Pharmacies Clinics Pharmacies
N% N% N % N %
Facilities reportedly subject to regulation mandating
Free/subsidized care for poor patients 112 24.1% 151 24.5% 67 11.9% 92 1.1%
No denial of treatment due to cost/inability to pay 112 28.6% 151 22.5% 67 10.4% 91 2.2%
Price ceilings 112 31.3% 151 37.7% 67 16.4% 90 18.9%
Note: ‘‘Don’t know’’ and refusals are both coded as missing values.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0027194.t005
Figure 5. Facilities Reporting Enforcement of Regulations. Countries: N Dark Grey: Kenya N Light Grey: Ghana.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0027194.g005
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10% less likely to be inspected relative to clinics, but more than
twice as likely to have heard of someone being penalized.
Technical and Financial Assistance for Improving Public
Health and Reducing Disparities
Supporting Access to Public Health Services. A visible but
small minority of private sector providers are incentivized by the
government in both countries to support them in providing health
services that are public goods (Figure 6); the percentage of facilities
involved however is no more than 10–20% for any type of service
covered by the survey in either country.
Comparing the top and bottom panel of Figure 6 shows that in
terms of incentivizing service delivery, technical assistance is more
widespread than financial assistance (similar to the case of capacity
building). Overall, in both countries, the smallest number of
facilities report being assisted in the provision of general health
education, but interestingly, this fraction is not much smaller than
the other categories. (We note, however, that our measure does
not capture the magnitude of funding, and we thus miss an
important dimension of the intensity with which the private sector
is supported). Table 7 shows that clinics are more likely than
pharmacies to receive services in this domain as well.
Overall, it appears that there is a large fraction of the private
sector that could potentially be further incentivized to help achieve
public health goals; this is particularly salient given that three of
the four measures above contribute directly to the achievement of
the Millennium Development Goals.
Equity. Figure 7 shows the percentage of facilities reporting
that they have heard of another facility receiving financial
support to promote service provision activities that address equity
issues. Rates are considerably higher in Kenya rather than
Ghana, particularly for promoting service in rural areas. In
Kenya, nearly 40% of facilities reported knowing a facility that
has received assistance to serve a rural area. About 30% reported
knowing a facility that has received assistance to serve a poor
urban area and a slightly higher number reported knowing a
facility that has received assistance for treating the poor. In
Ghana, these numbers are significantly lower, at 6–7% for all
three categories.
Table 8 shows that the difference between the two counties
manifests not only as higher average response rates in Kenya
overall, but also in a markedly different environment in the
pharmacy sector. In Ghana, consistent with the previous results,
pharmacies appear to be much less engaged than clinics.
However, in Kenya, pharmacies appear to be more frequently
incentivized (or have better knowledge of incentives being
provided) relative to clinics in the same country, and relative to
pharmacies in Ghana, by a wide margin 245% report knowing a
facility that has received assistance to serve a rural area, 36%
reported knowing a facility that has received assistance to serve a
poor urban area and 39% reported knowing a facility that has
received assistance, relative to 30%, 18% and 21% for clinics
respectively.
Discussion
In this study we surveyed private health facilities in Kenya and
Ghana to understand the extent to which and how governments
interact and engage with these facilities. The main conclusion from
this research is that government engagement with the private
health facilities is quite limited. The primary focus of this
engagement is command-and-control type regulations to improve
the quality of care. There is little attention paid to capacity
building for health care businesses through either technical or
financial assistance. The vast majority of facilities also receive no
government assistance in meeting public health and social goals.
Finally, government engagement with private pharmacies is often
neglected and clinics receive a disproportionate share of
government assistance. For the private health sector to contribute
more effectively to national health goals, increasing engagement
with private facilities as both businesses and medical care providers
will be critical.
A first order problem in both Kenya and Ghana is that the
government does little to monitor the activity of the private sector
in terms of the medical care provided and the finances of these
facilities. Such a widespread lack of information about the private
sector implies that governments in these countries have little ability
to assess the effectiveness of public policies targeted towards the
private health sector. The lack of monitoring of private health
sector activity also suggests that the governments have an
incomplete and dated view of the role the private sector is playing
in these economies.
The nature of the interactions most commonly-reported in the
survey suggests that, from the firm’s perspective, most govern-
ment intervention in these countries still takes a cautious
approach, viewing the private sector as a liability rather than
an opportunity. Policies tend to focus more strongly on
controlling the quality rather than fostering the private sector
to meet access goals. Across the board, direct technical assistance
is more prevalent across all types of capacity building than
financial sponsorship of such activities, possibly due to logistical
feasibility or ease of control. Many firms report receiving
incentives to promote quality or being subject to regulation and
inspection to ensure quality, but fewer report being involved with
interventions to support expansion, even if this promotes access
and equity outcomes.
Finally, when contrasting engagement across provider types, it
appears that across all types of interventions, in both countries,
pharmacies are relatively excluded. In both Ghana and Kenya,
government support for capacity building seems largely confined
to clinics. Pharmacies reported virtually no financial support, and
significantly less technical assistance, with some notable exceptions
such as incentives to expand into underserved areas in Kenya. The
Table 6. Facilities reporting enforcement of quality-related regulation, by type.
Clinics Pharmacies Clinics Pharmacies
N% N% N % N %
Inspected for quality standards in last 2 years 112 91.1% 151 83.4% 68 79.4% 92 94.6%
Know facility penalized for failing to meet quality standards 111 19.8% 151 46.4% 68 5.9% 91 13.2%
Note: ‘‘Don’t know’’ and refusals are both coded as missing values.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0027194.t006
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need for policy reform in this area, given the large fraction of
consumers, especially the poor, that report receiving health
services primarily or even exclusively from pharmacies.
Some important limitations should be noted, as well as their
implications for the findings reported here and for further research.
The firms in our sample were largely formally registered, implying
that the channels for communication between public and private
Figure 6. (top): Facilities Receiving Technical Assistance. (bottom): Facilities Receiving Financial Support. Countries: N Dark Grey: Kenya
N Light Grey: Ghana.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0027194.g006
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investigate engagement with many informal providers. Insofar as
levelsofgovernment interactionwithinformalprovidersarelikelyto
be lower, our results may be interpreted as an upper-bound on
engagement activity with the private sector as a whole. This study is
descriptive, but further research with this dataset will allow us to
understand variation in engagement within provider types—e.g., by
experience, size—and the degree to which engagement is associated
with outcomes for providers.
Overall, our findings suggest that there may be considerable
untapped potential for greater engagement with private health
facilities, particularly pharmacies. Improving this engagement will
likely help governments with limited resources to better take
advantage of the capacity of the private sector to meet access and
equity objectives, and to accelerate the achievement of the
Millennium Development Goals.
At the same time we acknowledge that lack of engagement
could be a function of limited resources, either financial or in
terms of technical capacity. Just as many governments struggle to
provide public health care services, they may also struggle to act as
effective monitors and engaged partners with the private sector.
The results presented here raise difficult questions about how to
allocate scarce resources: should resources be allocated to
additional public provision or to better engagement with the
private sector? Should additional monitoring resources be focused
on small, ubiquitous facilities (i.e., pharmacies) or larger facilities
providing more substantial care (i.e., clinics)? These challenges
should be addressed by future research.
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Table 7. Facilities receiving technical/financial assistance from the government to provide public health services in last 3 years, by
type.
Kenya Ghana
Clinics Pharmacies Clinics Pharmacies
N% N% N % N %
Facilities receiving technical assistance for
Providing childhood vaccinations 112 18.8% 151 4.0% 68 11.8% 92 1.1%
Control of HIV/AIDS 112 34.8% 151 6.0% 68 14.7% 92 2.2%
Control of malaria/TB 112 25.9% 151 4.6% 68 16.2% 92 5.4%
Health education 112 17.0% 151 4.0% 68 10.3% 91 2.2%
Facilities receiving financial support for
Providing childhood vaccinations 111 8.1% 151 0.0% 68 1.5% 92 0.0%
Control of HIV/AIDS 111 13.5% 151 1.3% 68 4.4% 92 0.0%
Control of malaria/TB 111 11.7% 151 0.7% 68 4.4% 92 3.3%
Health education 111 3.6% 151 0.0% 68 0.0% 92 0.0%
Note: ‘‘Don’t know’’ and refusals are both coded as missing values.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0027194.t007
Figure 7. Facilities Reporting Knowing of Facilities Receiving Support for Activities. Countries: N Dark Grey: Kenya N Light Grey: Ghana.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0027194.g007
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by the RAND HSPC and required that (1) the interviewer follow
an oral script approved by the RAND HSPC when administering
the consent process, and (2) the interviewer provide an information
letter to survey participants that explains the purpose of the study,
the risks and benefits of the study, and provides contact
information for the principal investigator of the study and local
research team.
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Table 8. Facilities reporting knowing of another facility receiving support from the government to promote equity, by type.
Kenya Ghana
Clinics Pharmacies Clinics Pharmacies
N% N% N % N %
Facilities reporting knowing another facility receiving support for
Opening a facility in a rural area 112 30.4% 151 45.0% 67 10.4% 92 3.3%
Opening a facility in a poor urban area 112 17.9% 151 36.4% 67 11.9% 92 4.3%
Providing treatment to the poor 112 21.4% 151 39.1% 67 10.4% 92 4.3%
Note: ‘‘Don’t know’’ and refusals are both coded as missing values.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0027194.t008
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